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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

OREM CITY,
Plaintiff/Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.
JAIME M. LONGORIA,
Case No. 20070218-CA
Defendant/Appellant.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Orem City's brief incorrectly misdirects and inaccurately distinguishes the
Court from the appropriateness of the authority relied on by Mr. Longoria. The
Constitutional and legal principles present in the fleeing cases relied on in the
authority presented by Mr. Longoria are equally present in his refusal case and
require this Court's attention in reversing the conviction and remanding for a new
trial.
The instructions given in this case during the second trial failed to
appropriately instruct the jury that the choices of Mr. Longoria to refuse field
sobriety tests and the chemical test may have been based on reasons consistent
with innocence. Without that language, the instruction violated state and federal
constitutional rights denying him due process rights and rights to a fair trial by an
impartial jury.
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPROPRIATELY INSTRUCT
THE JURY THAT REFUSALS TO DO FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS
AND A CHEMICAL TEST MAY BE SUPPORTED BY REASONS
COMPLETELY CONSISTENT WITH INNOCENCE.

Appellant Jaime Longoria urges reversal in this case because his
rights to due process and a fair trial as guaranteed under both the state and federal
constitutions were violated when the trial court gave the jury two different jury
instructions about the refusal evidence (both the refusal to perform field sobriety
tests and the refusal to submit to a chemical test) which omitted requested and
required language indicating that the two refusals each may be supported by
reasons completely consistent with innocence.
The City asserts that Mr. Longoria, in his brief, inappropriately relies
on case authority from flight cases which the City claims are inapposite to the
refusal scenario at Bar. Brief of Appellee at.5-15. The City argues that the
differences between the two substantive topics are different from a relevance
perspective such that the authority does not control. Brief of Appellee at 7.

The

City further contends that flight cases can abound with innocent explanations
where refusal cases simply cannot. Brief of Appellee at 9.1 A number of similar

1

Curiously, the authority the City relies on for this proposition is none other than
Judge Backlund who denied the requested language after having granted the new
trial at least in part on this very point. See Brief of Appellee at 10, citing Jury
Trial Transcript at 6.
2

reasons are urged upon the Court to discount and reject Mr. Longoria's claim of
reversible error. After belaboring its position and reiterating its premise, however,
the City makes a critical observation, conceding the following:
The fact that most reasonable people would view Longoria's refusal to test
as an indication of Longoria's impairment is simply an unfortunate reality
that Longoria must, in fairness, be required to face.
Brief of Appellee at 16. The City is accurate in its assessment that most people
would view a refusal to test as requested by the officer as an indication of
impairment; however, the City is misguided in its assertion that it somehow is
entitled to and/or should benefit from the choice of Mr. Longoria, or of any other
such suspect, to invoke a legal right the statutory framework allows him, i.e., to
refuse to participate or conform to the request of a test. It is precisely because of
this assessment conceded by the City that the cautionary instruction language is
required in this case just as it was in the fleeing authority relied on by Mr.
Longoria.
Moreover, contrary to the City's assertion, case authority exists which
would disagree with the City's argument that no innocent explanation exists for a
refusal to comply with an officer's request to test. Some of that authority goes so
far as to state (somewhat ironically given the City's relevance argument) that
refusals themselves are not relevant in a criminal case and should not be admitted
in the case in chief. People v. Duke, 357 N.W.2d 775 (Mich.App. 1984)(evidence
of a refusal to take the tests provided by statute should not be admitted in the case
in chief as it is not evidence of guilt or innocence). The Washington Supreme
3

Court addressed the issue under its statutory scheme noting the following: "A
defendant may have valid reasons for refusing a test, reasons which do not reflect
consciousness of guilt; it is probable that the jury will ascribe undue weight to the
refusal." State v. Zwicker, 713 P.2d 1101, 1104 (Wash 1984). Later that court
added,
The admission of refusal evidence for the sole purpose of explaining why
no Breathalyzer test was given is not probative of the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of guilt. Such evidence neither
proves nor disproves the accusation that the defendant was affected by
alcohol.
Id.
Other cases which have examined the issue conclude that refusal evidence
to be admissible must contain either a warning that the evidence can be used in a
criminal prosecution or that a cautionary instruction must be given. State v.
Neville, 346 N.W.2d 425 (S.D. 1984)(Supreme Court of South Dakota ruled on
state constitutional grounds following remandfromthe United States Supreme
Court deciding that failure to inform Neville of the admission of the refusal at his
criminal trial was in violation of due process and the prohibition against selfincrimination.); State v. Zwicker, 713 P.2d at 1109 (Washington's implied
consent statute requires the accused be warned that a refusal may be used in a
subsequent criminal proceeding). In Michigan, the Court of Appeals held in 1984
that evidence of a refusal is not admitted in the case in chief, if such evidence
comes in by inadvertence or in rebuttal then the following instruction is required
to be given if requested by either party.
4

Evidence was admitted in this case which if believed by the jury, could
prove that the defendant had exercised his or her right to refuse a chemical
test. You are instructed that such a refusal is within statutory rights of the
defendant and is not evidence of his guilt. You are not to consider such a
refusal in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
People v. Duke, 357 N.W.2d 775, 802 (Mich.App. 1984).
Contrary to the City's declaration that no reasons consistent with innocence
existing to justify a refusal, there are many. A few such reasons consistent with
innocence include frustration with the officers treatment to that point, perception
of racist behavior by the officer, sexist behavior, poor conditions to perform tests,
general clumsiness or lack of coordination which renders someone unable to
perform, fear of needles, concern of contamination, religious reasons, injury,
nervousness, lack of trust of the officer. Many other such reasons could be
contemplated.
Admittedly, no Utah authority exists on this point besides the governing
statutes. That authority clearly indicates there is a "repercussion" in the Utah
driver license hearing arena for this choice of refusal made by a suspect. Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6a-524. But any such repercussion is neither expressly permitted
nor allowed in the criminal arena. A legion of authority exists defining the rights
against self-incrimination in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence and the Miranda
progeny which appropriately instruct that whenever a suspect invokes a lawful
right available to him that the invocation of the right cannot be used or construed
against him. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Likewise, fourth amendment jurisprudence does not permit prosecutors in a
criminal case to use a suspect's refusal to consent to a search as grounds to support
probable cause; rather, it is the suspect's right to refuse to cooperate with a
requested search. State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d 650 (Utah 2002). The City's claim
that fingerprint and voice samples are more analogous is incorrect. Brief of
Appellee at 11. Unlike those rights listed above, fingerprint and voice samples
are specifically permitted to be obtained over the objection of the accused if
probable cause is established by the prosecutor. Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. As discussed above, in field sobriety tests and chemical tests an
accused is authorized to refuse without the prosecutor's ability to force a test.
While our statute allows the admission of the refusal, inappropriate
instructions like those given in this case run contrary to these longstanding
principles discussed above designed to protect against inappropriate inferences
being drawn from invoking a legal right to refuse to take a test.
When coupled with due process considerations as urged in Mr. Longoria's
Opening Brief, considerations of fundamental fairness, the presumption of
innocence and the allocation of the burden of proof require that trial courts instruct
juries appropriately to maintain the rights defendants enjoy under the
constitutions.
The Supreme Court of the United States in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S.
510 (1979), explained years ago that instructions capable of interpretation by the
jury as being mandatory or conclusive are violative of the burden of proof
6

standard and the presumption of innocence. The Court provided the rationale as
follows:
[G]iven the lack of qualifying instructions as to the legal effect of the
presumption, we cannot discount the possibility that the jury may have
interpreted the instruction in either of two more stringent ways.
First, a reasonable jury could well have interpreted the presumption as
"conclusive," that is, not technically as a presumption at all, but rather as
an irrebuttable direction by the court to find intent once convinced of the
facts triggering the presumption. Alternatively, the jury may have
interpreted the instruction as a direction to find intent upon proof of the
defendants voluntary actions (and their "ordinary" consequences), unless
the defendant proved the contrary by some quantum of proof which may
well have been considerably greater than "some" evidence-thus effectively
shifting the burden of persuasion on the element of intent.
Id. at 517 (emphasis added).
For these same reasons the Utah Supreme Court inarguably criticized the
instruction that has been discussed in the briefs from State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573
(Utah 1983). The instruction at issue in Bales read as follows:
The flight or attempted flight of a person immediately after the
commission of a crime or after he is accused of a crime that has been
committed, is not sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact
which, if proven, may be considered by you in the light of all other proven
facts in deciding the question of his guilt or innocence. The weight to
which such circumstance is entitled is a matter for the jury to determine.
You are further instructed that flight affords a basis for an inference of
consciousness of guilt and constitutes an implied admission.
Id. at 574.
The Utah Supreme Court found that the first paragraph of this instruction
was acceptable, in part due to the language that the flight was not itself sufficient
to establish guilt. The Court found that the language of the second paragraph to
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be improper and suggested the language urged on the court as necessary in this
case:
We are also persuaded that the first paragraph of theflightinstruction
given in this case was acceptable in view of the evidence. It should,
however, have incorporated two further ideas. Aflightinstruction will not
be completelyfreefromcriticism unless it advises the jury that there may
be reasons for flight fully consistent with innocence and that even if
consciousness of guilt is inferred from flight it does not necessarily reflect
actual guilt of the crime charged.
In contrast, we can find no justification for the second paragraph of the
flight instruction given to the jury in this case. Indeed, the State does not
even attempt to justify it. So far as we have been able to determine, the
idea thatflightconstitutes an "implied admission" of guilt is not supported
by any federal or state decision or by any of the analysis justifying flight
instructions.
Id. at 575-76 (emphasis added).
Comparing the instructions given in this case by the trial court with the
instructions reviewed by the Utah Supreme Court in the supporting case authority
demonstrates the erroneous instructions violated those rights.
Instruction No. 8 [the new trial]
You are instructed that under Utah law a person operating a motor
vehicle in this State is considered to have given consent to a chemical test
or tests of his breath, blood or urine for the purpose of determining whether
he/she was operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or a combination thereof.
When an officer arrests a person for Driving Under the Influence of
Alcohol and/or Drugs, the officer may request the person to submit to a test
of his breath, blood or urine to determine the person's blood or breath
alcohol level.
You may take notice of and give whatever weight you determine to
the Defendant's refusal to submit to the blood or breath test requested by
the officer, just as you may weigh and consider any evidence presented to
you.
8

R. 228.
Instruction No. 9 [the new trial]
The Defendant is not required, by law, to submit to the officer's request to
perform field sobriety tests; however, you may take notice of and give
whatever weight you determine to the fact that the defendant refused to
perform any field sobriety tests.
R. 227.
These jury instructions given by the court in this case were improper as
they provided a directive to the jury to use his failure to take the tests against him.
The instructions left no ability to rebut the inference the City conceded was
present with most reasonable jurors permitting a shift in the burden of proof to the
Defendant and resulted in substantial adverse effects on the rights of the defendant
to due process of law, a fair jury trial, and ultimately a fair verdict entered by a
properly instructed jury based on the appropriate law. Mr. Longoria insists that
had appropriate instructions been given, the jury would likely have reached a
different verdict.
Finally, the City's assertion that if there was error in the instruction, that
error would be harmless and not require reversal is itself erroneous. The standard
of review in issues of jury instructions, as identified by the parties, is presented as
a question of law to be reviewed under a correction of error standard. Brief of
Appellant at iii; Brief of Appellee at 1. No deference is to be given the trial court.
Brief of Appellee at 1.
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In Sullivan v. Louisianna, 508 U.S. 275 (1973), the United States Supreme
Court unanimously held that a constitutionally-deficient reasonable doubt
instruction was structural. By structural the Court meant that the error was not
reviewable under a harmless error analysis. The Court reasoned that "where the
instructional error consists of a misdescription of the burden of proof, which
vitiates all the juryfs findings," no jury verdict of beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
exists upon which to base a harmless error analysis. Id. at 281 (emphasis in
original). The Court continued:
There being no jury verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt, the
question whether the same verdict of guilty beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
would have been rendered absent the constitutional error is utterly
meaningless. There is no object, so to speak, upon which harmless error
scrutiny can operate. The most an appellate court can conclude is that a
jury would surely have foundpetitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubtnot that that jury's actual finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
would surely not have been different absent the constitutional error. That is
not enough. The Sixth Amendment requires more than appellate
speculation about a hypothetical jury's action, or else directed verdicts for
the State would be sustainable on appeal; it requires an actual finding of
guilty.
The deprivation of that right [to be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
of every element of an offense], with consequences that are necessarily
unquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably qualifies as 'structural
error.
Id. at 281-82.
Inasmuch as these errors complained of herein likewise go directly to the
burden of proof and presumption of innocence guaranteed to Mr. Longoria, they
also are structural and go directly to the constitutional rights to a fair trial and due
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process, the Court's failure to properly instruct, when authority existed to justify
the requested instructions, reversal is required. In fact, the court had used the
same authority to grant the new trial in the case based on the arguments signing
the findings of fact and conclusions of law citing the consideration. R. 148, point
3.

CONCLUSION
The prosecution's case focused on Mr. Longoria's refusal to perform field
sobriety tests and his refusal to submit to a chemical test and the presumption that
these refusals established his guilt. As such, the impact of the improper jury
instructions had on this case was substantial; and absent these improper
instructions, the jury's verdict would have been different.
THEREFORE, Mr. Longoria respectfully requests that this Court find that
there was an error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon his
rights to due process and a fair and impartial jury trial meriting the convictions be
reversed and a decision entered granting a new trial in this matter.
DATED this2£ day of January, 2008.

JASON SCHATZ(# 9969)
Attorney for Appellant
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